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EUNICE D. CLARK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HAROLD
M. GIBBONS et al., Defendants and Appellants.
[1] Physicians - Malpractice - Appeal. - To determine whether
sufficient evidence of negligence was adduced against doctors
in a malpractice suit, the appellate court's power begins and
ends with a finding that the record contains some substantial
evidence, contradicted or not, supporting the jury's conclusion.
[2] Id.-Malpractice-Appeal.-On appeal by defendants in a
medical malpractice action, the record must be read in the
light most advantageous to plaintiff; all conflicts must be
resolved in her favor; and all legitimate and reasonable inferences must be indulged to uphold the verdict for plaintiff, if
that is possible.
[3] Id.-Malpractice-Evidence.-In an action for damage~ resulting from surgery that was not completed after the anesthesia
terminated prematurely, sufficient evidence, independent of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, supported a verdict against the
anesthetist where it appeared that anesthetics lasting the
required time were available but were not used, that the
anesthetist admitted his responsibility to know the surgeon's
needs and his failure to inquire how long the surgeon would
take, that with proper care anesthetics do not usually wear off
prematurely, that their improper administration can cause
premature termination, that plaintiff's initial reaction indicated improper administration, and that the anesthetist failed
to record the premature termination, as he should have done,
thereby permitting an inference of guilty knowledge regarding
the tennina tion.
[41" 4b] Id.-Malpractice-Evidence.-In an action to recover for
. injury resulting from surgical reduction of a trimalleolar
fracture of plaintiff's ankle, sufficient evidence, independent of
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, supported a verdict against the
surgeon where it was shown that he became upset when the
anesthesia began to wear off prematurely and terminated the
surgery without consulting the anesthetist as to the possibility
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Physicians and Surgeons, § 61; [3,

4] Physicians and Surgeons, § 56(3); [5] Physicians and Surgeons, § 57; [6] Negligence, § 133(5); [7] Negligence, § 134; [8]
Negligence, § 139; Physicians and Surgeons, § 57; [9, 12] Physicians and Surgeons, § 56; [10] Negligence, § 135(5); [11] Negligence, § 135(4); [13] Negligence, §§ 198(2), 202; Physicians and
Surgeons, § 59.
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of extending the anesthesia, though the surgeon admitted that
healing of the skin at the nonnal rate did not permit a second
operation within the necessary time, that lle had the duty to
speak to the anesthetist if the operation were going to be
unusually long, that he required more time than he usually did
for such surgery, that the fracture was one of the most severe
he had ever seen, and that he did not advise the anesthetist
that additional time would be needed.
Id.-Malpractice-Jury Questions.-In a malpractice action
involving injuries following the premature termination of
anesthesia during surgery, though the anesthetist testified that
inadequate anesthesia could have resulted from several unpredictable causes and that he used due care in administering the
anesthetic, the credibility of his testimony was properly left
to the jury.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Oonditions for Application.Generally, res ipsa loquitur applies where the occurrence of an
injury is of such a nature that, in the light of past experience,
it probably resulted from soneone's negligence and that
defendant is probably the one responsible.
Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Basis for Rule.-The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is fundamentally predicated on inferences deducible from circumstantial evidence and the weight to be given
them ..
Id. - Res Ipsa Loquitur - Effect on Burden of Proof: Physicians-Malpractice-Jury Questions.-Under conditions giving
rise to the res ipsa loquitur doctrine when medical personnel,
acting in concert, collectively have access to the chief evidence
as to the cause of injury but plaintiff does not, an individual
doctor, to avoid the inference of negligence as a matter of law,
must go beyond showing that it was unlikely or improbable he
was negligent and must establish his freedom from negligence
by evidence that cannot be rationally disbelieved. Falling short
of such a showing, it remains for the jury to determine
whether the inference arising from the doctrine was rebutted
as to any particular doctor.
Physicians-Malpractice-Evidence.-In a medical malpractice case, plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the cause of injury
may exist not only where he is totally unconscious but also
where he is partially unconscious and largely unaware of what
medical personnel were doing; and where the chief evidence as
to the cause of injury is accessible to medical personnel but

[6] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 307 et seq; Am.Jur., Negligence
(lst cd § 295 et seq).
[9] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Physicians, Dentists, and Other Healers of
the Sick, § 98; Am.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons (1st ed § 9f»
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not to plaintiff, his being under a local anesthetic rather than
a general anesthetic does not eliminate the duty of explanation
by those who had control over the procedure.
[10] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur~Occurrence Unlikely Without Negligence.-Evidence that an accident rarely occurs when
due care is used does not, without more, indicate a particular
occurrence is more likely than not the result of 8Omeone's
negligence.
[11] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Probability of Negligence. - The
likelihood of a negligent cause for injury is increased if the
low incidence of accidents, when due care is used, is combined
with proof of specific negligent acts of a type that could have
caused the injury; when those two facts are proved, the likelihood of a negligent cause may be sufficiently great that a jury
may properly conclude the accident was more probably than
not the result of someone's negligence.
(12] Physicians-Malpractice-Evidence.-In a medical malpractice case, a doctor's negligent act of a type that could have
caused the accident, which does not ordinarily occur in the
exercise of due care, greatly increases the probability that his
negligence caused plaintiff's injuries.
(18] Negligence-Instructions-Res Ipsa Loquitur: Medical Treatment: Physicians-Malpractice-Instructions.-In an action
involving injury resulting from surgery not completed after
the anesthesia terminated prematurely, a res ipsa loquitur
instruction was proper where there was evidence that an
anesthetist, using proper care and obtaining proper information, could have made the anesthetic last long enough, that the
surgeon and anesthetist did not consult each other about the
time needed for the surgery, that plaintiff's injury was caused
by premature termination of the anesthesia and the surgeon's
determination to terminate surgery though both doctors were
aware it should be performed and completed as soon as possible, and that there was a reasonable method to !landle the
premature termination of anesthesia when it occurred.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County. Irving H. Perluss, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for medical malpractice. Judgment for plaintiff
affirmed.
Peart, Baraty & Hassard, Wilke, Fleury & Sapunor, Richard G. Logan, Hanna & Brophy, Donald R. Brophy and
Eugene A. Biglow for Defendants and Appellants.
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Jack H. Werchick and Arne Werchick for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
PETERS, J.-Plaintiff Eunice D. Clark brought this action
against Dr. Selmants, an anesthesiologist, Dr. Gibbons and his
partner Dr.. Horn, orthopedic surgeons, and Sutter Community Hospital of Sacramento for damages for injuries resulting from an operation allegedly negligently performed in
Sutter Community Hospital by Drs. Gibbons and Selmants.
The jury returned verdicts of $27,500 against all of the
doctors and exonerated the hospita1. 1 Motions for a 'new trial
were denied, and the doctors have appealed from the
judgment.
Defendants' contentions are that the verdicts are not
supported by sufficient evidence of negligence, and that the
trial court committed reversible error by giving conditional
res ipsa' loquitur instructions. Both contentions are
unsound.
[1] It must be kept in mind that in determining whether
sufficient evidence of negligence was adduced against the
doctors,2 the power of an appellate court begins and ends
with a finding that the record contains some substantial evidence, .contradicted or uncontradicted, which supports the
conclusion reached by the jury. [2] The record m;ust be
read in the light most advantageous to the plaintiff. All
conflicts must be resolved in her favor; and all legitimate and
reasonable inferences must be indulged in to uphold the
verdict, if that is possible. (Orawford v. Southern Pac. 00., 3
Ca1.2d 427,429 [45 P.2d 183].)
The record discloses that on October 30, 1960, at approximately 2 p.m., plaintiff Eunice Clark, who was 41 years old,
obese and in good health, suffered a fractured right ankle
when she slipped and fell on a waxed floor in her home. She
was taken by ambulance to the Sutter Community Hospital.
and examined by her physician Dr. Smith. After viewing Xrays of the fracture, Dr. Smith told her that it was a case for
an orthopedic surgeon. Mrs. Clark requested the services of
Dr. Gibbons who had previously treated her husband and who
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IThe Jiability of Dr. Hom was predicated upon his partnership with
Dr. Gibbons. No separate contentions are made as to his liability. It is,
in effect, admitted that Dr. Horn's liability depends upon that of Dr.
Gibbons. Plaintiff has not appealed from the judgment in favor of the
hospital.
.
2Plaintiff did not produce any expert witnesses of her own. For expert
testimony she relied upon the evidence of the defendants called under
seetion 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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happened to be in the hospital at that time. Dr. Gibbons
determined from viewing the X-rays that plaintiff had a
severe trimalleolar fracture of tbe right ankle and tlmt an
open reduction, i.e., reduction by surgery, should be performed as soon as possible. He informed plaintiff that he
would prefer to operate that night since the ankle would be
stiff by the next morning. Plaintiff agreed.
Dr. Selmants, one of the anesthesiologists on the hospital
staff, undertook to administer the anesthesia. Plaintiff gave
the doctor a preanesthesia history which revealed that she had
eaten between 1 and 2 p.m. Dr. Selmants believed that a
general anesthetic should not be given to one who had eaten in
the 12 hours preceding surgery, and that a general anesthetic
was dangerous for a patient who had eaten within six or seven
hours of surgery. Dr. Selmants concluded that plaintiff was
not a safe subject for a general anesthetic. He told plaintiff
that she should be given a spinal anesthetic, and she agreed to
a spinal, although she said that she would prefer a genera1.
Dr. Gibbons concurred in the decision to give a spina1.
Dr. Selmants selected the agent to be used for the spina1.
He testified that it was the anesthesiolgist's duty to know the
time required for surgery and that he did not ask Dr. Gibbons
how long the operation would take, because he knew from
previously working with Dr. Gibbons that the surgeon averaged two hours for usual reductions of this kind. This case
was not unusual, he believed, and would accordingly require
two hours. The agent that Dr. Selmants chose was 10 milligrams of pontocaine. It was designed to maintain a level of T10 for two hours plus or minus 15 minutes, and it was
predictable in intensity and duration.
Dr. Gibbons testified that plaintiff's fracture was severe,
and that he expected the operation to take from two to three
hours. The anesthesiologist said that the anesthesia he selected
could not be used unmodified for surgery of from two and a
half to three hours, but that by adding epinephine to the
pontoca.ine, he could have produced an agent with a predictable duration of over four and a half hours.
Prior to surgery plaintiff was nervous and anxious. She was
not more upset however than any person with an ankle injury
and she was calmed by injections of vistaril and nembutal and
taken into surgery at approximately 8 p.m.
Dr. Selmants then administered the spinal anesthetic and
made pinprick tests to assure that the proper level of anesthesia had been achieved. After the anesthesia was injected
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)

,-)

CLARK V. GIBBONS

[66 C.2d

and the numbness started up her legs, plaintiff felt that she
could not breathe amI her voice became squeaky. Dr. Selmants
stated that a patient should not suffer from shortness of
breath at a level of T-IO, and that plaintiff's difficulty in
breathing could have been "some undue effect (from] the way
the anesthetic' was given."
When the anesthesia reached the level necessary for
surgery, Dr. Gibbons commenced the operation. The level of
anesthesia remained adequate at first; but after about one
hour the doctors noticed from plaintiff's unconscious movements that the anesthesia was beginning to wear off. At this
point Dr. Gibbons had completed all of the reduction except
for reduction of the posterior fragment of the tibia. Dr. Selmants believed that 20 minutes more were needed to complete
the operation, but Dr. Gibbons testified that no less than
another hour would have been required.
Dr. Selmants could have extended the surgical anesthesia
without harm to the patient. He stated that intravenous
demerol could have been used for that purpose and that there
was no particular reason not to use it, although the extension
obtained might still have been insufficient to complete the
operation. Also, another spinal could have been given. Dr.
Gibbons 'stated that he did not think that plaintiff "would
have been up to" another spinal and that in turning her for
the spinal all the preppi.ng and draping would have to be
undone and this might subject her to a risk of infection.
In any event, the operation was terminated, the incision
was closed, and a cast was applied to plaintiff's ankle in an .
attempt to reduce the posterior fragment by external pressure.
Dr. Gibbons' operative report mentioned that the operation
was not completed because the anesthetic did not last for the
required length of time. Dr. Selmants failed to note those
facts, although he was supposed to make an accurate report of
how the anesthesia proceeded with relation to the needs of the
operation.
The decision to terminate surgery was made primarily by
Dr. Gibbons. He was in control of the surgery and could have
asked for an extension of the anesthesia. He had stated in his
deposition that he became upset when the anesthesia began to
wear off and that he did not consult with Dr. Selmants about
extending the anesthesia but just said "I think we will quit
for tonight and do this another time." At the trial, however,
both he and Dr. Selmants testified that they discussed the
question whether the anesthesia should be continued or the
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operation terminated and that Dr. Selmants agreed with the
decision to terminate.
Dr. Gibbons testified that, when he made the decision to
terminate, he expected to complete the operation later, but did
not do so because blebs, infected blisters of the skin, developed; that it was very common for blebs to accompany an
injury of this nature, that plaintiff's blebs healed at tll('
normal rate, but that healing of blebs at the normal rate did
not permit a second operation within the time when a second
operation would have been of any value.
Three days after the operation Dr. Gibbons noticed tllat the
posterior fragment had slipped back to some extent and that
another open reduction was required. A second operation
could not be performed, however, because pressure and resu]tant swelling, as pointed out, had caused blebs, which present.ed a serious risk of infection if the skin were cut.
Dr. Gibbons charged plaintiff less than the normal operating fee because his operation was unsuccessful. She now
suffers from osteoarthritis in the ankle joint, which is painful.
The arthritis might have resulted from the fracture even if a
perfect union had been achieved. However, there is expert
testimony that the chances of getting arthritis were increase(l
by the failure to achieve a complete reduction; and the
defendants do not claim that the evidence is insufficient to
show that the arthritis was due, at least in part, to the failure
to complete the operation.
Nothing but a fusion, which would impair the ankle's up
and down movement, could now give plaintiff a pain free
ankle. Dr. Gibbons' partner, Dr. Horn, offered to fuse the
ankle for a token fee of $100.
Plaintiff's position is that the jury received sufficient evidence to find that the imperfect reduction causing the present
injury was the result of (1) the negligence of Dr. Selmants in
selecting and administering an anesthetic which wore off
before the operation was completed and (2) the negligence of
Dr. Gipbons in (a) not informing Dr. Selmants that the operation might well take longer than the two hours which Selmants expected the operation to take and (b) terminating the
operation prematurely rather than ordering an extension of
the anesthesia.
The evidence upon which plaintiff primarily relies to show
negligence in the selection or administration of the anesthetic
is the following testimony of Dr. Selmants: "Q. . . . if
proper care is used, in the usual course of events, anesthetics
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like this don't run out or wear out, do they-surgical anesthetics TA. No, sir.

I
I.

And I said' no, sir.' What I mean is, they can. There is no
control. There is-there is-there is a variable, as anything
else we do in medicine. There is nothing exact that guarantees
this will happen, this will not happen, how long this will last.
You cannot ever predicate what you're doing on the basis
that it's going to be 100 percent; you have a certain area of
predictability, and that's what you go on. Q. Now, my question was-you see, you misunderstood. I'll say it again. My
question was, if proper care is used in a situation like this,
anesthetics like this usually do not run out, do they T A. Yes,
usually they do not run out." Dr. Gibbons stated in his
deposition that if the anesthesiologist uses proper care and
obtains proper information about the case, he can make a
spinal anesthesia last long enough for an operation of this
kind.
Later in direct examination Dr. Selmants and Dr. Horn
testified that it is common knowledge in the field of anesthesia
that there is always an inherent risk that, even when due care
is used, a spinal anesthesia will not last as long as contemplated. Dr. Selmants explained that immediately upon the
injection of any spinal anesthetizing agent a process of detoxification commences within the area of the nerve root blockage
which ultimately causes the anesthesia to wear off. The speed
of detoxification in any individual depends primarily upon
the amount of circulation in the nerve area and the amount of
myelin covering the nerve itself.
[3,4a] The evidence, independently of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, is sufficient to support the verdict against both
doctors. So far as Dr. Selmants is concerned, while the evidence shows that he and Dr. Gibbons were not negligent in
making the initial decision to give a spinal rather than a
general anesthetic,S there is evidence that Dr. Selmants was
negligent in selecting the agent to be used for the spinal. The
orthopedic surgeon expected the operation would take from
two to three hours to complete. Anesthetics were available
that would have lasted at least that long without undue
danger to the patient. Dr. Selmants did not use those anesSEven it the jury could tind that a spinal was not absolutely necessary
for the plaintiff's safety, there is no ('vidence that a general was necessarily preterable in this rase. The mere giving of a spinal whenever the
patient is experiencing the normal agitation due to an injury is certainly
not sufficient to constitute negligence.
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thetics because he did not expect that the operation would
take as long as three hours. Dr. Selmants admitted, however,
that it was his responsibility to know the needs of the surgeon
and that he did not inquire how long the surgeon would take
in this case. Because he underestimated the probable length of
the operation, he gave an anesthetic which was designed to
last a maximum of two hours and 15 minutes and a minimum
of one hour and 45 minutes. The jury could have found that
this choice of anesthetic was negligent.
In addition, Dr. Selmants testified that anesthetics do not
usually wear off prematurely if proper care is used. Premature termination can be caused by improper administration of
the agent, and plaintiff's initial reaction to the injection, 11er
squeaky voice and difficulty in breathing, is evidence that the
anesthetic was improperly administered. Dr. Selmants failed
to note the premature termination in his records relating to
the progress of the anesthesia, as he should have done .. The
jury could infer from such omission that he possessed some
guilty knowledge regarding the termination. From the symptoms of improper administration and the inference of guilty
knowledge, the jury could properly imply that Dr. Selmants'
had administered the anesthetic improperly.
[6] Although Dr. Selmants testified that inadequate anesthesia could have resulted from several unpredictable causes
and that he used due care in the administration of the anesthetic, the credibility of this testimony was properly left to
the jury.
[4b] There is also sufficient evidence of negligence to
support the verdict against Dr. Gibbons. Dr. Gibbons could
have been found responsible for the improper selection of an
anesthetic. Although the anesthesiologist ordinarily has the
duty to ask the surgeon about the projected length of the
operation, Dr. Selmants testified that the surgeon should
speak to the anesthesiologist if the operation is going to be
unusually long. Dr. Selmants testified that Dr. Gibbons averaged two hours in operating on trimalleolar ankle fractures .
. Dr. Gibbons testified that Mrs. Clark's fracture was one of
the most severe trimalleolars he had ever seen. Under those
circumstances the jury could find that Dr. Gibbons expected
an unusually long operation and was under a duty to warn'
Dr. Selmants of the need for an anesthetic that would last
more than two hours.
Dr. Gibbons stated in his deposition that he became upset
when the anesthesia began to wear off and, without consulting
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Dr. Selmants about the possibility of extending the anest hesia, said that the surgery would be terminated now and

,

I,

(:olllpleted at a later time. Hc also admitted that healing of
the skin at the normal rate did not permit a second operation
to be performed within the necessary time.
Thus, from Dr. Gibbons' own statements, the jury could
have found that in making the decision to terminate he acted
rashly knowing the dangers, but without considering the
possibility of extending the anesthesia and under the erroneous belief that the completion of the reduction could be
accomplished by a second operation. Both the possibility of
extending anesthesia and the possibility of further surgery
are clearly major factors which should have been considered
by a surgeon confronted with inadequate anesthesia. Under
these circumstances, the jury could conclude without any
other expert testimony that in making the decision to terminate surgery, Dr. Gibbons did not exercise that care and skill
ordinarily practiced by other specialists in orthopedic surgery
under similar circumstances."
In addition, the facts of this case warrant the use of the
conditional res ipsa loquitur instructions. [6] As a general
rule, res ipsa loquitur applies where the occurrence of the
injury i,s of such a nature that it can be said, in the light of
past experience, that it probably was the result of negligence
by someone and that the defendant is probably the person
who is responsible. In determining whether such probabilities
exist with regard to a particular occurrence, the courts have
relied both on common knowledge and on expert testimony.
(Davis v. Memorial Hospital, 58 Ca1.2d 815, 817 [26 Cal. Rptr.
633, 376 P.2d 561] ; Siverson v. Weber, 57 Ca1.2d 834, 836 [22
Cal.Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97].)
"This court has held in one case that since a physician normally under·
takes to exercise only that care and skill common to the profession and
that since some mistakes are inherent in this exercise, proof of mistaken
diagnosis or wrong method of treatment in itself is not sufficient to show
lack of skill and care. (Patterson v. Marcus, 203 Cal. 550, 552-553 [265
P. 222].) However, as noted by Prosser, "Such decisions, together with
the notorious unwillingness of members of the medical profession to testify against one another, may impose an insuperable handicap upon a
plaintiff who cannot obtain the proof." (Prosser on Torts (3d ed. 1964)
§ 39, p. 231.) Each case must be determined on its own facts, and at least
where, as here, there is evidence not only of improper treatment, but of
the doctor's agitation and total failure to consider the alternative methods of treatment and their consequences, a jury is competont to find without the conclusion of an expert that the doctor did not exercise that
degree of care and skill common to other specialists in the community.
(Cf. Quintal v. Laurel Gr01J~ Hospital, 62 Ca1.2d 154, 161 [41 Cal.Rptr.
577,397 P.2d 161].)
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[7] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine fundamentally predicated upon inferences deducible from circumstantial evidence and the weight to be given to them. (Quintal
v. Laurel Grove Hospital, supra~ 62 Ca1.2d 154, 163.) As
stated in Fowler v. Seaton, 61 Ca1.2d 681, 686-687 [39 Cal.
Rptr. 881,394 P.2d 697] :
"One of the frequently quoted statements of the applicable
rules is to be found in the opinion of Chief Justice ErIe in
Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co. (1865) 3 H. & C.
596, quoted in Prosser on Torts (2d ed. 1955) section 42, at
page 201, as follows: 'There must be reasonable evidence of
negligence; but where the thing is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care. '
, 'Of course, negligence and connecting defendant with it,
like other facts, can be proved by circumstantial evidence.
There does not have to be an eyewitness, nor need there be
pirect evidence of defendant's conduct. There is no absolute
t-equirement that the plaintiff explain how the accident
happened. Res ipsa loquitur may apply where the cause of the
injury is a mystery, if there is a reasonable and logical inference that defendant was negligent, and that such negligence
caused the injury. (Prosser on Torts, supra, at p. 204.)"
(See also Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, supra, 62 Ca1.2d
154, 164-165.)
More than 20 years ago in Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Ca1.2d
486, 489 et seq. [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258], this court
had occasion to consider the application of the doctrine to
cases where injury was received by a medical patient while
unconscious under the influence of anesthesia. It was
stated:
"There is, however, some uncertainty as to the extent to
which res ipsa loquitur may be invoked in cases of injury
from medical treatment. This is in part due to the tendency,
in some decisions, to lay undue emphasis on the limitations of
the doctrine, and to give too little attention to its basic underlying purpose. The result has been that a simple, understandable rule of circumstantial evidence, with a sound
background of common sense and human experience, has
occasionally been transformed into a rigid legal formula,
which arbitrarily precludes its application in many cases

~.
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where it is most important that it should be applied. If the
doctrine is to continue to serve a useful purpose, we should
not forget that' the particular force and justice of the rule,
regarded as a presumption throwing upon the party charged
the duty of producing evidence, consists in the circumstance
that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or
innocent, is practically accessible to him but inaccessible to
the injured person.' . . .
" . . . [I]t is difficult to see how the doctrine can, with any
justification, be so restricted in its statement as to become
inapplicable to a patient who submits himself to the care and
custody of doctors and nurses, is rendered unconscious, and
receives some injury from instrumentalities used in his treatment. Without the aid of the doctrine a patient who received
permanent injuries of a serious character, obviously the result
of someone's negligence, would be entirely unable to recover
unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose
to disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts
establishing liability. (See Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont.
251 [7 P.2d 228].) If this were the state of the law of negligence, the courts, to avoid gross injustice, would be forced to
invoke the principles of absolute liability, irrespective of
negligence,. in actions by persons suffering injuries during the
course of treatment under anesthesia. But we think this juncture has not yet been reached, and that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquit.ur is properly applicable to the case before us."
(Ybm'ra v. Spangard, supra, 25 Ca1.2d 486, 489-491.)
In Ybarra, it was pointed out that in a modern hospital a
patient is quite likely to come under the care of a number of
persons in different types of contractual relationships with
each other, including physicians and surgeons, anesthetists,
and nurses; that every defendant in whose custody the plaintiff was placed for any period was bound to exercise ordinary
care to see that no unnecessary harm came to the plaintiff;
that, although at the trial some of the defendants might be
found liable and others absolved, this would not preclude
application of the doctrine; and that, since each of the
defendants in acting together to provide the medical treatment at one time or another was in control of the various
agencies which might have harmed plaintiff, they should have
the burden of initial explanation. (25 Cal.2d at pp. 491492.)
Ybarra involved an injury which may not have been
received during the operation, but Leonard v. Watsonville

)
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Community Hospital, 47 Ca1.2d 509, 514 et seq. [305 P.2d 36],
involved an injury during the operation and followed Ybarra
in holding that where the conditions of the doctrine are satisfied all persons who had any control over the patient 's b~dy
or the instrumentalities causing injury may properly be called
upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an
explanation of their conduct. In Leonard it was further held
that the inference of negligence arising under the doctrine is
dispelled as a matter of law with regard to a particular doctor
only where other evidence establishes as a matter of law that
he is free from negligence. The evidence establishing the
· absence of negligence in such a case must be clear, positive,
uncontradicted and of such a nature that it cannot be
· rationally disbelieved.
Ybarra and Leonard establish that, if the conditions giving
rise to the doctrine are present when the medical personnel
are treated as a group acting in. concert and they collectively
have access to the chief evidence as to the cause of the injury
· but the plaintiff does not, a single doctor may not escape the
inference as a matter of law merely by showing that as to him
alone it is more probable than not that he was free from fault.
The basis of the application of the doctrine to all defendants
in the cases is that the medical personnel acted as a group and
that collectively, without regard to what anyone may individually know, or did, they are in a position to explain the
cause and produce the chief evidence bearing on the question
whereas the plaintiff is not. [8] To avoid the inference as a
tnatter of law an individual doctor must go beyond showing
that it was unlikely or not probable he was negligent and
must establish that he is free from negligence by evidence
which cannot be rationally disbelieved. Falling short of such a
showing, it remains for the jury to determine whether the
inference arising from the doctrine has been rebutted as to
any particular doctor.
[9] The fact that the patient may have received a local
anesthetic rather than a general anesthetic does not eliminate
the duty of explanation of those who had control over the
procedure where the chief evidence as to the cause is accessible to them but not to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's lack of
knowledge may exist not only where he is totally unconscious
but also where he is partially unconscious and largely, if not
entirely, unaware of what the medical personnel are doing.
The conditions giving rise to the doctrine here existed. This
problem ·was recently discussed in Quintal v. Laurel Grove
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Hospital, supra, 62 Ca1.2d 154, a case involving injuries
during an operation. There the plaintiff suffered a cardiac
arrest during the administration of a general anesthetic, and
it was held that an instruction on conditional res ipsa loquitur was proper even though the medical experts testified that
a cardiac arrest, although a rare occurrence, is a known and
calculated risk in the giving of a general anesthetic and
though there was no expert testimony that when cardiac
arrests do occur, they are more likely than not the result of
negligence. There was evidence that a method of meeting the
unusual risk existed. Experts testified that when due care is
used, cardiac arrests do not ordinarily occur, and, in addition,
evidence was presented of fever and apprehension of the
patient before administration of the anesthetic which tended
to show that the cardiac arrest in that case was caused by
negligence 0.£ the doctors.
Thus, we recognized in Quintal that proof that when due
care is exercised an injury rarely occUrs, accompanied by
other evidence indicating negligence, may be sufficient to
warrant an instruction on conditional res ipsa loquitur. (See
also Ragusano v. Civic Center Hospital Ji'oundation, 199
CaI.App.2d 586, 593-594 [19 CaI.Rptr. 118].) This is particularly true where, as in Quintal and in the present case, the·
injury occurred as the result of a normal procedure such as
the administration! of an anesthetic, rather than from a
complex operation.
[10] It is true that evidence that an accident rarely occurs
when due care is used does not without more indicate that a
particular occurrence is more likely tha~ not the result of
someone's negligence. (Siverson v. Weber, supra, 57 Cal.2d
834,839.) In Siverson it was stated:
, 'To permit an inference of negligence under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur solely because an uncommon complication
develops would place too great a burden upon the medical
profession and might result in an undesirable limitation on
the use of operations or new procedures involving an inherent
risk of injury even when due care is used. Where risks are
inherent in an operation and an injury of a type which is rare
does occur, the doctrine should not be applicable unless it can
be said that, in the light of past experience, such an occurrence is more likely the result of negligence than some cause
for which the defendant is not responsible." (57 CaI.2d at p.
839.) But in Siverson there was no evidence of a negligent act
of a type that could have caused the accident, and none of the
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witnesses "testified that anything was done during the operation which was contrary to good medical practice." ( 57
Ca1.2d at pp. 838-839.) The court refused to permit an
instruction on the doctrine where the only basis for it was
evidence that the injury suffered by the patient rarely occurs
as a result of the surgical procedure.
[11] The likelihood of a negligent cause is increased if the
low incidence of accidents when due care is used is combined
with proof of specific acts of negligence of a type which could
have caused the occurrence complained of. When those two
facts are proved, the likelihood of a negligent cause may be
sufficiently great that the jury may properly conclude that the
accident was more probably than not the result of someone's
negligence.
[12] That a doctor has done a negligent act of a typP. that
could have caused the accident, which does not ordinarily
occur in the exercise of due ~are, greatly increases the probability that it was his negligence that caused the plaintiff's
injury. Thus, the low incidence of accidents when due care is
used plus negligent conduct of a type which could have
caused the occurrence may make it probable that the occurrence was the result of someone's negligence and that the
defendant is probably the person who was responsible. Those
are the requirements for applying res ipsa loquitur.
The administration of an anesthetic is now a normal and·
tested procedure. [13] Dr. Selmants stated that one of the
reasons for selecting pontocaine in the instant case was its
predictability as to duration. Medical experts testified that
spinal anesthetics do not usually run out prematurely if
proper care is used, and in explanation of this conclusion, Dr.
Selmants stated only that the predictability of such a-uesthetics was not 100 percent. Dr. Gibbons stated in his deposition without qualification that if an anesthesiologist uses
proper care and obtains proper information about the case, he
can make a spinal anesthesia last long enough for an operation of this kind.
There is evidence that the injury here was caused by the
anesthesia wearing off prematurely and that Dr. Selrnants was
responsible for selecting and administering an anesthetic
which would be adequate for the length of surgery required.
Dr. Selmants testified that he did not consult with the
surgeon regarding the length of the operation and that he
used an anesthetic which, according to the testimony of the
surgeon, was inadequate for the estimated length of the oper-
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ation. In addition, Dr. Selmants stated that plaintiff's
unusual reaction to the anesthetic could have been caused by
"some undue effect the way the anesthetic had been
given. "
There is also evidence, as we have seen, from which the
jury could conclude that Dr. Gibbons in the exercise of due
care should have advised Dr. Selmants of the anticipated
extraordinary length of the surgery and that the former acted
rashly in determining to terminate the surgery. It bears
emphasis in this connection that the doctors were aware that
the procedure should be performed and completed as soon as
possible.
This evidence, taken as a whole, along with the evidence
that therc was a reasonable method of handling the risk when
it occurred is cert.ainly sufficient for the jury to find that the
injury was. probably the result of negligence of someone and
that the defendants were probably the persons responsible.
Accordingly we conclude that it was proper to instruct the
jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It is not claimed that
the form of the conditional instructions given was improper.
The jUdgment is affirmed.
Mosk, ·J.,.-Burke, J., and Peek, J.,. concurred.
TOBRINER, J.-I concur in the judgment, but I am
unable to join either the majorIty opmlOn or the opinion of
the Chief Justice. I propose here to explain my dissatisfaction
with the present definition and application of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur in that limited number of cases in which rare
and inexplicable accidents occur in the operating room. In
pursuing thc laudable goal of shifting the losses occasioned by
such a.ccidents to the parties best able to protect ·against them
through insurance, we have imposed the onus of negligence
and malpractice upon capable and dedicated members of the
medical profession, burdening the law of res ipsa loquitur
with a sweep that is inaccurate, inefficient, and inequitable. I
propose a redefinition of the doctrine governing these cases
which seems to me more candid, more certain, and more
consistent with our underlying objectives.
Initially, I set forth my reasons for joining the majority in
affirming the judgments against both defendants. Given the
evidence from which thc jury could have found that the
*Retired Associate JUlttice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
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specific acts and omissions alleged by plaintiff were negligent
and proximately caused her injury, I am unwilling to assume
that the verdict against the defendants rested upon the trial
court '8 instruction on res ipsa loquitur. Although I believe
that the instruction should not have been given under the
circumstances of this case, I would hold that the defendants
waived any right to demand a new trial on that ground when
they failed to request a special verdict to reveal the theory
upon which the jury found them liable. (Code Civ.' Proc.,
§ 625.)1
I cannot agree, however, with the route by which the
majority reaches its result. As the Chief Justice demonstrates
in his separate 6pinion herein, neither common knowledge nor
expert testimony supported an inference in this case that accidents such as befell the plaintiff ordinarily bespeak a negligent cause. 2 To give a res ipsa instruction under such
IAn appellate court should not disturb a general verdict merely because
the trial court gave the jury an abstractly correct instruction which the
facts before it did not warrant, provided that another theory on which
the case was submitted to the jury finds substantial support in the evidence and is unaffected by errol'. (See Estate of Hellier (1914) 169 Cal.
77, 83 [145 P. 1008]; Posz v. Burchell (1962) 209 Ca1.App.2d 324, 335·
337 [25 Ca1.Rptr. 896], and cases there cited; see also Tucker v. Landllcci
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 762, 766 [22 Cal.Rptr. 10, 371 P.2d 754]; Gillespie v.
Rawlings (1957) 49 Ca1.2d 359, 368·369 [317 P.2d 601]; Edwards v.
Gullick (1931) 213 Cal. 86, 88 [1 P.2d 11]; VerdelZi v. Gray's Harbor
etc. Co. (1896) 115 Cal. 517, 525 [47 P. 364, 778]; Crosett v. Whelan
(1872) 44 Cal. 200, 203; Moss v. Coca Cola Bo.ttling Co. (1951) 103 Cal.
App.2d 380, 384·385 [229 P.2d 802]; Shields v. Oxnard Harbor Dist.
(1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 477, 491 [116 P.2d 121] (McComb, J.); Hume v.
Fresno Irr. Dist. (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 348, 356·357 [69 P.2d 483]; cf.
Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co. (1949) 33 Cal.2d 514, 520 [203 P.2d 522] ;
Blanton v. Curry (1942) 20 Ca1.2d 793, 799·800 [129 P.2d 1] (per
curiam); Gerdes v. Pacific Gas g' Electric Co. (1933) 219 Cal. 459, 471·
473 [27 P.2d 365, 90 A.L.R. 1071]; Christensen v. Malkin (1965) 236
Cal.App.2d 114, 123 [45 Cal.Rptr. 836]; Rather v. City g- County of San
Francisco (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 625, 636 [184 P.2d 727].) Although our
courts have not always taken this approach (see, e.g., Burks v. Blackman
-(1959) 52 Ca1.2d 715, 719 [344 P.2d 301]; Edwards v. Freeman (1949)
· 34 Ca1.2d 589, 594 [212 P.2d 883]; Huebotter v. Follett (1946) 27 Ca1.2d
765, 770·771 [167 P.2d 193]; Oettinger v. Stewart (1944) 24 Ca1.2d 133,
139·140 [148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221]; Christensen v. Bocian (1959)
169 Cal.App.2d 223 [336 P.2d 1018]; Schaffer v. Claremont Country Club
(1959) 168 Ca1.App.2d 351, 358 [336 P.2d 254, 337 P.2d 139], reh. den.
168 Cal.App.2d 358·359), consistent adherence to the rule stated herein
would prevent needless appeals and retrials without injustice to either
party.
2Plaintiff adduced expert testimony to show that, when due care is
used, premature termination of anesthetic is rare. The record contains no
evidence, however, indicating that in those rare cases in which an anes·
· the tic does terminate prematurely, a negligent cause is more probable
• than a non-negligent one. Although plaintiff presented evidence of specific
l
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circUlIlBtances invites a purely speculative leap and entrusts
the jury with unreviewable power to impose or withhold liability as it sees fit. If public policy demands that defendants be
held responsible for unexplained accidents without a reasoned
finding of fault, such responsibility should be fixed openly
and uniformly, not under the guise of negligence and at the
discretion of a jury. (Cf. Escola v. Ooca Oola Bottling 00.
(1944) 24 Cal.2d 453, 463 [150 P.2d 436] (Traynor, J.,
concurring) . )
I am likewise disturbed by the conclusion of the Chief
Justice that the victims of accidents which do not truly
"speak for themselves" should be required to present evidence that the kinds of accidents they suffered are ordinarily
caused by negligence. Even if expert medical testimony were
readily available to plaintiffs in malpractice cases,8 such a
rule would unfairly penalize the surgical patient who is
negligent acts which could have caused premature termination, such evidence provided no rational basis for a conclusion that, of the .vanou8
possible causes, a negligent one was probably responsible.
The majority asserts: "[I]f the low incidence of accidents when due
care is used is combined with proof of specific acts of negligence of a
type which could have caused the occurrence complained of•.•• the jury
may properly conclude that the accident was more probably than not the
result of someone's negligence." (A.nte, p. 413.) I cannot agree.
Suppose, for example, that in 5 percent of all operations in which due
care is used, a certain spinal anesthetic inevitably terminates prematurely
because of an undetectable excess of myelin on the patient's nerves; suppose further that a specific technique for administering the anesthetic
docs not alter the likelihood· of premature termination in patients with an
excess of myelin but creates a 2 percent risk of premature termination in
normal patients, whereas another available technique, equally desirable
in all other relevant respects, creates only a 1 percent risk of prematura
termination in normal patients. Under these circumstances, the technique
which creates twice as high a risk in normal patients and yields no compensating benefit would presumahly be considered negligent.
If one were to examine 100 operations in which this negligent technique
had been employed, one would expect to find 2 operations in which such
negligence caused premature termination, compared with 5 in which an
overabundance of myelin caused premature termination. Yet, in everyone
of these hypothetical operations, the majority would invite the jury to
infer a negligent cause without further guidance from the evidence before
it; I find it disturbing to note that in 5 out of every 7 cases of premature
termination coupled with a specific negligent act, this inference would _. blame the doctor for an accident he did not cause.
3TIle strong reluctance of doctors to testify against each other has
frequently been noted (see, e.g., Huffman v. Lindquist (1951) 37 Ca1.2d
465, 484 [234 P.2d 34, 29 A.L.R.2d 425] (Carter, J., dissenting); Belli,
An A.ncient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment (1956)
1 Vill.L.Rev. 250, 259) and numerous corrective measures have been suggested (see, e.g., Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony (1963) 77
Harv.L.Rev. 333, 338-350), but the problem apparently remains (see Note.
Medical Malpractice - E:x:pert Testimony (1966) 60 Nw.U.L.Rev. 834,
835·837).
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injured by an accident of a type too rare or too little understood to permit meaningful statistic analysis of its probable
cause. 4 Although I agree with the Chief Justice that the above
requirement for application of the res ipsa doctrine follows
from its basic premises, I submit that use of the doctrine itself
fails to serve the ends of justice in cases such as this. Indeed,
even the expanded version of res ipsa loquitur espoused by the
majority falls considerably short of truly protecting the
victims of unfamiliar and unexplained surgical mishaps, since
the majority would deny plaintiffs the benefit of a res ipsa
instruction unless they could produce the kind of testimony
which the Chief Justice would require, or could persuade a
medical expert to characterize as substandard the conduct of
those entrusted with their care. I)
Upon reexamining what seem to me the grave shortcomings
of these varying formulations of res ipsa loquitur in surgical
accident cases, I have concluded that the basic error lies in
primary reliance upon the concept of negligence and that the
courts should undertake a fundamental reassessment of the
largely fictitious and often futile search for fault which
presently characterizes medical injury litigation of the kind
here involved.
At the outset we must recognize that, in the present state of
medical knowledge, risks which even the most cautious physician could not have prevented may lead to accidents which
even the most expert cannot explain. Although the vast
majority of medical practitioners are protected financially by

I

.Since the accidents with which we are here concerned by hypothesis
occur rarely, there is little hope of obtaining broadly based statistics of
the sort hypothesized for the computations in footnote 2, 8'Upra. The
complexity of the concept of negligence as applied to medical techniques,
coupled with the difficulties of determining the cause of the few accidents
whieh might be included in any purported sample. render suspect the
claim of any expert who asserts that in a representative group of eases
he was able to determine the relative proportion of negligent and nonnegligent causes.
liThe majority reaffirms the holding of Siverson v. Weber (1962) 57
Cal.2d 834, 839 [22 Cal.Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97], that rarity alone does
not warrant a conditional res ipsa instruction, and limits the holding of
Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital (1964) 62 Ca1.2d 154, 164-166 [41 Cal.
Rptr. 577,397 P.2d 161], to cases in which rarity is coupled with "proof
of specific acts of negligence of a type which could have caused the occurrence complained of." (Ante, p. 413.) Plaintiffs who cannot qualify
under Quintal by obtaining such proof are thus relegated to the basic
rule of Siverson that res ipsa is applicable only if common knowledge or
expert witnesses establish that accidents of the sort which befell the
plaintiff are I I more likely the result of negligence than some cause for
whieh the defendant is not responsible." (57 Ca1.2d at 839.)
lIc.M-l.
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liability insurance covering such accidents,6 and although
doctors and hospitals can readily transfer the cost of this
insurance protection to their patients through higher medical
fees, no technique yet devised can protect a doctor from the
devastating impact which an adjudication of malpractice can
have upon his professional standing. 7 Fearing that his competence may thus be impugned whenever he adopts a procedure
difficult to justify to a lay jury, a surgeon may feel compelled
to forego an unorthodox technique in order to protect his
reputation from ruin. 8 Any system which thus diverts the
doctor's attention from the operating room to the courtroom
leaves much to be desired. 9
In light of the expansion of res ipsa loquitur undertaken by
such decisions as Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, supra, 62
Ca1.2d 154, and by the majority opinion in the present case,
there can be little doubt that the net effect of the doctrine Is
to shift from plaintiffs to defendants the cost of a certain
number of unexplainable accidents in which no meaningful
basis exists for finding the defendants at fault. tO Thus the
6A 1959 estimate showed that more than 92 percent of American doctors carried professional liability insurance, with an average coverage
ranging from $25,000 for general practitioners to $100,000 for specialists.
(Silvernuin, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, Saturday Evening Post, April
25, 1959, pp. 36, 120.)
7Indeed, many doctors genuinely fear that even if. they win a malpractice case, they will be "all but destroyed professionally." (Shindell,
Medicine versus Law: A Proposal for Settlement (1953) 151 A.M.A.J.
1078, 1079.)
8See Cohn, Medical JJaZpractice Litigation: A Plague on Both H0'U8es
(1966) 52 A.B.A.J. 32; McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practi·
tioners (1959) 12 Vand.L.Rev. 549, 608; Silverman, ope cit. supra, April
11, 1959, p. 48; The Urge To Sue, Time, Nov. 28, 1960, pp. 69, 70. A
number of hospitals, for example, are said to have prohibited the use of
spinal anesthetics, purportedly reacting to cases adjUdicating that physicians employing their facilities were guilty of malpractice because of
urifortunate results following the use of such anesthetics. (Silverman,
ibid.)
9When every patient is viewed largely as a potential plaintiff, the
method of treatment chosen by the physician may well be that which
appears easiest to justify in court rather than that which seems best from
a purely medical standpoint. (See Siverson v. Weber, supra, 57 Ca1.2d at
p. 839; Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cali/Otrnia Medical Malpractice
/,aw - Expansion of a Doctrine to the Bursting Point (1962) 14 Stan.
L.Rev. ~51, 282.) The prohahle victim of such litigation-oriented medical
practice is of course the patient, who suffers first when he receives less
than t.he best available care, ancI second when the doctor whom he decides
to sue understandahly appeals to the jury's inclination to protect a
physician's professional standing. (See Fleming, Developments in thtJ
English Law of Medical Liability (1959) 12 Vand.L.Rev. 633, 634.)
1 USee generally 2 Harper and James, Torts (1956) § 19.6, p. 1081; Bee--also id., §19.5, pp. 1080·1081 & fns. 16-18; §19.7, p. 1089 & fn. 11:
Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital·Accident" Insurance: A Needed
First Step Toward the Displacement of Liability for" Medical Malproo-
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concept of negligence as a prerequisite to medical liability
now provides only sporadic and illusory protection for the
physician. At the same time, insistence under all circumstances upon a nominal finding of fault frustrates the riskshifting purpose of the res ipsa doctrine as currently applied
since it stands as an occasionally insuperable obstacle to the
financial protection of inexplicably injured patients.
A system openly imposing liability without any pretense of
negligence in this narrow range of cases can avoid unwarranted imputations of fault while permitting the rational
development of badly needed doctrine. Simultaneously, such cL
system can insure that the burdens of unexplained accidents
will not fall primarily upon the helpless but will be borne
instead by those best able to spread their cost among all who
benefit from the surgical operations in which these misfortunes occur.11
. The record in this case supports the conclusion that the
plaintiff's arthritic condition resulted from the premature
termination of anesthesia, bringing the operation to an
untimely halt. We deal here neither with a complication
flowing from an undetectable idiosyncrasy of the patient 12
nor with a risk which the patient voluntarily assumed in
electing to undergo this type of surgery; we d(~[.d im,tead wilh
a failure of the operation to accomplish the result that the
patient, in light of her own physical condition, reasonably
expected it to achieve.13
tice" (1964) 31 U.ChLL.Rev. 279, 281-282 & fns. 8-9; Morris, Res Ipsa
Loquitur - Liability Without Fault (1958) 25 Ins. Counsel J. 97.
llSee Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra, passim; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts (1961) 70 Yale L.J. 499, 548·
549; James, A.ccident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance (1948) 57 Yale L.J. 549, 550 & fn. 1, 553 & fn. 8; cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 63-64 [27 Cal.
Rptr. 687,377 P.2d 897].
12As the Chief Justice points out, expert testimony in this case supports the view that a certain number of patients are afflicted with a con·
dition involving an overabundance of myelin surrounding their nerves.
This rare condition, known as rachiresistance, apparently cannot be detected in advance and either prevents the deposit of an adequate quantity
of the anesthetizing agent on the patient'8 nerves 01' accelerates the rate
at which the agent disappears. One of the defendants testified that the
patient "had good and profound anesthesia for the prescribed time be. tore she did feel the pain" and that, for this reason, he concluded that
the patient probably" detoxified faster than normal" because of rachiresistance. In light of the trial court's instl'Uctions and the jury's verdict,
the jury evidently rejected this explanatioll, and I see no basis on which
an appellate court could disturh the jury's conclusion in this regard.
18 1 note in this connectioll that some courts have permitted injured
patients to sue for breach of a warranty that surgery would not aggra-
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If this failure could have been traced to the anesthetic
itself, or to some mechanical inadequacy in the' hospital 's
surgical equipment, the plaintiff would not have been required
to establish negligence as a prerequisite to recovery.14 The
wholly fortuitous circumstance that this plaintiff's injury
resulted instead from some undetermined mishap in the
operating room should make no difference: in neither case
should the patient's right to recover turn on her ability to
isolate a negligent cause for her surgical injury.
In such situations, the jury should be instructed that, if it
finds that the plaintiff was injured in the course of an operation within the collective control of the defendants lCi and
that this type of injury rarely occurs in such operations,16
then it must return a verdict for the plaintiff unless the
defendants establish that the injury resulted from an idiosyncrasy of the patient 17 or that the patient knowingly and
voluntarily assumed the risk of incurring such an injury.18
vate their malady. (See Recent Decisions (1962) 37 Notre Dame Law.
725.) The transition from express to implied warranty, and thence to a
legally imposed liability without fault, is too familiar to require detailed
elucidation here. (See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 59
Ca1.2d, 57, 61-63.)
USee, 'e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 59 Ca1.2d
57; see also Bowles v. Zimmer Manufacturing 00. (7th Oil'. 1960) 277
F.2d 868, 874 (breach of warranty by manufacturer of surgical pin) ; ef.
Note, The Medical Professio-n and Strict Liability for Defective Products
-..4. Limited Extension (1965) 17 Hastings L.J. 359.
15Compare Ybarra v. Spangard (1944) 25 Ca1.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687,
162 A.L.R. 1258].
16Compare Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, supra, 62 Ca1.2d 154.
Plaintiffs who suffer from injuries of a type which oommonly accompany
a given medical procedure could of course proceed against defendants on
an ordinary negligence theory. (See fn. 19, infra.)
17Compare Prosser, TIle Fall oJ the Oitadel (Strict Liability to the
Oonsumer) (1966) 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791, 810-811 & fns. 104·106. A doctor
who knew or should have learned of the patient's peculiarity might
theoretically be held liable if his negligence could be shown to have caused
the injury.
18Compare Farber v. Olkon (1953) 40 Ca1.2d 503, 511 [254 P.2d 520],
in which we concluded that a malpractice plaintiff was not entitled to an
instruction on res ipsa loquitur since undisputed testimony established
that the bone fractures of which the plaintiff complained constituted" a
calculated and even an expected risk of the [electro-shock] treatment."
In determining which risks a patient may voluntarily assume in submitting to a given medical procedure, the controlling consideration must of
course be the reasonable expectations of the patient arising out of his
relationship with the doctor, not the precise language of any prior agreement or understanding. (See Tunkl v. Regents of University of Oalifornia
(1963) 60 Ca1.2d 92 [32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441, 6 A.L.R.3d 693];
Darling v. Oharleston etc. Hospital (1965) 33 1l1.2d 326 [211 N.E.2d
353]; ef. Gray v. Zurich Insurance 0'0. (1966) 65 Ca1.2d 263, 270·271
[54 Cal.Rptr. 105, 419 P.2d 168].)
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Once the elusive and destructive search for an act or omission of "malpractice" has been restricted to those cases in
which a negligent cause may actually be demonstrated,19 a
far higher percentage of all medical controversies will be
settled out of court, without the "economic and emotional
strain of protracted litigation requiring difficult or impossible
proof." (Ehrenzweig, op. cit., supra, 31 U.Chi.L.Rev. at
288.) In the relatively few cases which reach trial, the imposition of financial liability will not be aggravated by the
ruinous consequences of a determination of malpractice unless
the evidence points logically to such a finding.
We should not impose the stigma of negligence upon a
doctor merely because an operation yields an uncommon and
inexplicable result; in the present state of the medical art,· the
rarity of an event may well bear no relationship to negligenc('.
Courts which ignore that fact in formulating the law of res
ipsa loquitur unjustly penalize physicians and plunge the
legal process into an abyss of uncertainty and obfuscation.
Our proper concern for the financial protection of the patient
gives us no warrant for faulting the doctor.
I must conclude that, in this limited category of cases, the
attempt to :fix liability exclusively in terms of traditional
notions of fault has outlived its utility. Once it appears that
an unexplained surgical accident has caused an unexpected
injury, no useful end is advanced by rehearsing the ancient
ritual of assessing blame.

-_ ... - ......

TRAYNOR, C. J.-I concur in the judgment under the
compulsion of Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, 62 Ca1.2d
154 [41 Cal.Rptr. 577, 397 P.2d 161J, but deem it appropriate
to set forth why the evidence in this case, as in Quintal, does
not justify a res ipsa loquitur instruction.
A physician's duty is to exercise that degree of care and
skill ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of his
profession under similar circumstances. (Sinz v. Owens
(1949) 33 Ca1.2d 749,753 [205 P.2d 3, 8 A.L.R.2d 757J.) He
19Nothing in this opinion should be construed to suggest a change in
the means by which a patient might prove actual negligence or in the
defenses which a doctor might properly interpose to a negligence claim.
Thus, for example, instructions on res ipsa loquitur would remain available when warranted by the evidence; there would no longer be any justification, however, for giving such instructions simply because rarity anll
specific acts of negligence might both be present in a given case. (See
fn. 2, supra.) A verdict predicated upon inferred negligence under a res
ipsa instruction would henceforth be sustained only under the conditions
let forth in the separate opinion of the Chief Justice.
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does not guarantee a cure. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
cannot properly be invoked to make him an insurer of the
recovery of persons he treats. The Latin words cannot obliter.
ate the fact that much of the functioning of the human body
remains a mystery to medical science and that risks inherent
in a given treatment may occur unexplainably though the
treatment is administered skillfully. The occurren'ce of an
injury that is a calculated risk of an approved course of
conduct, standing alone, does not permit an inference of
negligence.
Such an inference must be based on more than speculation.
If it is to be drawn from the happening of an accident, there
must be common knowledge or expert testimony that when
such an accident occurs, it is more probably than not the
result of negligence. (Siverson v. Weber (1962) 57 Ca1.2d 834,
836 [22 Cal.Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97]; Davis v. Memorial
Hospital (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 815, 817 [26 Cal.Rptr. 633, 376
P.2d 561] ; Cavero v. FrankUn General Benefit Soc. (1950) 36
Ca1.2d 301, 309 [223 r.2d 471].) .A showing that such an
accident rarely occurs does not justify an inference of negligence without a further showing that when the rare event
l1appens, it is more likely than not caused by negligence. 1
(Siverson·v. Weber, supra; Seneris v. Haas (1956) 45 Ca1.2d
811,824-826 [291 P.2d 915,53 A.L.R.2d 124].)
Nor does evidence of specific acts of negligence justify an
inference of negligence based on res ipsa loquitur, for the
inferences the jury may reasonably draw from the happening
of the accident alone obviously cannot be determined by evi.
(lence of the defendant's conduct.
There is no support in the record for a res ipsa loquitur
jnstruction. Two unfortunate events combined to cause the
injury, namely, the premature termination of anesthesia and
the premature termination of surgery. The former was in the
it l'Nt of Dr. Selmants' responsibility, the In tter in Dr. Gib.
bons'.
Although there is evidence that premature termination of
anesthesia is unusual, there is no evidence that when it occurs
it is more probably than not caused by negligence. On the
('ontrary, there is a satisfactory medical explanation consis.
tent wit.h due care. There is an inherent risk that a patient
1" To permit an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur solely because an uncommon complication develops would place
too great a burden upon the medical profession and might result in an
undesirable limitation on the use of operations or new procedures involving an inherent risk of injury even when due care is used. Where risks
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may have an excessive amount of myelin on his nerves. This
condition cannot be detected in advance. It either prevents the
deposit of an adequate quantity of the anesthetizing agent on
the nerve or accelerates the rate at which it disappears.
Physiological and pharmacological evidence indicated that it
was such an overabundance of myelin that caused the premature termination of anesthesia in this case.
Accordingly, there is no basis for an inference that premature termination of anesthesia is probably the result of negligence. The hiatus in proof cannot logically be filled by
invoking the rarity of the result and specific evidence of
negligence. The facts that premature termination is rare, that
plaintiff felt that she could not breathe and her voice became
squeaky after anesthesia, and that defendants did not discuss'
the anticipated duration of surgery shed no light on the question whether premature termination of anesthesia is ordinarily caused by negligence. 2
The record is likewise devoid of any evidence tllat prematUre termination of surgery in cases of this kind is ordinarily
the result of negligence. Indeed, there is not even evidence
that such termination is rare. Although there is evidence that
Dr. Gibbons was negligent in failing to consider the relevant
factors before making his decision to terminate the operation,
such evidence of specific negligence sheds no light on the
inferences that may be drawn from the happening of the accident itself.
The absence of any basis for invoking res ipsa loquitur
against either defendant individually also forecloses invoking
it against them jointly under Ybarra v. Spangard (1945) 25
Ca1.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258]. The Ybarra case
involved an accident that was clearly the result of someone's
negligence, and the court imposed a burden of explanation
upon all the defendants who had assumed control of the
unconscious plaintiff. That case cannot reasonably be invoked
when the accident itself affords no evidence of negligence.
are inherent in an operation and an injury of a type which is rare does
occur, the doctrine should not be applicable unless it can be said that, in
the light of past experience, such an occurrence is more likely the result
of negligence than some cause for which defendant is not responsible."
(Siverson v. Weber, supra, 57 Ca1.2d 834, 839.)
2The majority opinion mentions that Dr. Sclmants did not note in his
operative report that the surgery was not completed, and that Dr. Gibbons
charged plaintiff less than llis usual fee and his partner offered to fuse
the ankle for a token fee. Whatever remote relevance these facts might
have, they add nothing to a determination of the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the happening of the injury alone.
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The expansion of res ipsa loquitur undertaken in Quintal
places too great a burden on the medical profession and may
result in an Undesirable limitation on the use of procedures
involving inherent risks of injury even when due care is used.
(Siverson v; Weber, supra, 57 Ca1.2d 834.) An anesthesiologist and a surgeon, confronted with one of the inherent risks .
of an operation not susceptible to advance calculation, may be
found liable for any unfortunate consequence. In planning a
course of action they may therefore feel compelled to consider
not simply the best interests of the patient but the procedure
that will be most readily justified to a lay jury.
The essence of Quintal is restated in the majority opinion,
which first discredits rarity alone as a basis for re~ ipsa, but
then states: "The likelihood of a negligent cause is increased
if the low incidence of accidents when due care is used is
combined with proof of specific acts of negligence of a type
which would have caused the occurrence complained of. When
these two facts are proved, the likelihood of a negligent cause
may be sufficiently great that the jury may properly conclude
that the accident was more probably than not the result of
someone's negligence." That statement might be appropriate
for counsel to make in arguing to the jury that it could infer
from evidence of defendants' negligent conduct that such
conduct caused the injury. It has no relation, however, to res
ipsa loquitur, which involves the inferences that may be
drawn from the mere happening of the accident.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reverse the judgment for
the reasons expressed by Mr. Presiding Justice Pierce in the
opinion prepared by him for the Court of Appeal in Clark v.
Gibbons (Cal.App.) 50 Cal.Rptr. 127.
Appellants' petitions for a rehearing were denied May 17,
1967. Traynor, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that
the petitions should be granted.
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